Last updated 25/07/2026. Financial data as of 24/07/2026.
Optivalue Tek Consulting is a Delhi based technology consulting company that listed on the NSE SME platform in September 2025. Its reported numbers look excellent. Its audit report tells a more complicated story.
The 30-second version
Optivalue Tek Consulting reported FY26 revenue of Rs 90.74 crore, up 61.8 percent, and net profit of Rs 13.76 crore, up 13.4 percent. In the same audited results, the statutory auditor A. Mishra and Associates raised two key audit matters: provisional revenue recognition, and Rs 59.87 crore of unreconciled balances whose existence and recoverability could not be sufficiently evidenced. The company’s own clarification filing also addressed a contravention of the Companies Act relating to advances given to related parties. Cash flow from operations was negative Rs 12 crore in FY26 and negative in three of the last five years, while debtor days doubled from 112 to 241. The company has 545 shareholders in total and roughly Rs 12.8 lakh of average daily traded turnover, so ownership and trading are both extremely concentrated.
What does Optivalue Tek actually sell?
It sells technology consulting. Think of a bank or a phone company with old software that can’t keep up. Optivalue Tek’s engineers rebuild and connect that software so it runs on modern systems.
The work covers data integration, cloud migration, DevOps (development and operations automation), core banking applications, and telecom BSS and OSS systems (business support systems and operational support systems). The company also markets data science and generative artificial intelligence services. It holds a CMMI (Capability Maturity Model Integration) Level 5 compliance certificate, which is a recognised quality benchmark for software delivery organisations.
Customers pay because switching a half finished modernisation project to another vendor is expensive and slow. That’s the moat, and it’s a real one in this industry. The company reports a single business segment, IT consultancy services.
The company was founded in June 2011 by Ashish Kumar and converted to a public limited company in 2024. Its registered office is in Delhi. Revenue mix by client industry and geography isn’t disclosed in the filings we could access, and neither is customer concentration.
How fast is the business really growing?
| Year ended 31 March | Revenue (INR crore) | Operating profit (INR crore) | Operating margin (%) | Net profit (INR crore) | Earnings per share (INR) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY22 | 29 | 8 | 28 | 5 | Pre bonus basis, not comparable |
| FY23 | 39 | 4 | 11 | 3 | Pre bonus basis, not comparable |
| FY24 | 37 | 8 | 22 | 5 | Pre bonus basis, not comparable |
| FY25 | 56 | 16 | 29 | 12 | 7.04 |
| FY26 | 91 | 18 | 20 | 14 | 5.88 |
Source: audited annual results filed with the National Stock Exchange, board approved 28 May 2026, and the company’s exchange filed financial history. Period covered: FY22 to FY26. Earnings per share for FY22 to FY24 sits on a pre bonus share count and isn’t comparable, because the company issued 9 bonus shares for every 1 held in August 2025.
Revenue growth is genuinely fast. Sales have grown at 33 percent a year over three years and 62 percent in the latest year.
Profit growth is slower than sales growth, and earnings per share actually fell from Rs 7.04 to Rs 5.88. Two things did that. Margins dropped, and the share count rose after the IPO (initial public offering).
Notice FY23 too. Revenue rose but operating margin fell to 11 percent. This company’s margins move around a lot from year to year, so one strong year isn’t a trend.
Why did margins fall in the second half of FY26?
| Half year | Revenue (INR crore) | Operating profit (INR crore) | Operating margin (%) | Net profit (INR crore) | Earnings per share (INR) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| H1 FY25, to Sep 2024 | 23 | 8 | 37 | 6 | 3.81 |
| H2 FY25, to Mar 2025 | 33 | 8 | 24 | 6 | 3.35 |
| H1 FY26, to Sep 2025 | 30 | 10 | 33 | 7 | 3.09 |
| H2 FY26, to Mar 2026 | 60 | 8 | 13 | 7 | 2.79 |
Source: half yearly results filed with the National Stock Exchange. Period covered: April 2024 to March 2026. SME (small and medium enterprise) platform companies report every six months, not every quarter.
This is the most important table in the report. Revenue doubled between the two halves of FY26, from Rs 30 crore to Rs 60 crore. Operating profit went the other way, from Rs 10 crore down to Rs 8 crore.
So the company sold twice as much and earned less doing it. The operating margin fell from 33 percent to 13 percent in six months. The filings we could access don’t explain why.
Earnings per share has now fallen in four consecutive half year periods, from Rs 3.81 to Rs 2.79. That’s happening while revenue is climbing, which is an unusual combination.
Did the profit turn into cash?
| Year ended 31 March | Net profit (INR crore) | Cash from operations (INR crore) | Free cash flow (INR crore) | Operating cash as % of operating profit |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY22 | 5 | -4 | -5 | -21 |
| FY23 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 83 |
| FY24 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 72 |
| FY25 | 12 | -4 | -4 | -18 |
| FY26 | 14 | -12 | -32 | -32 |
| Five year total | 39 | -13 | -35 | Negative |
Source: cash flow statements filed with the National Stock Exchange. Period covered: FY22 to FY26. Totals are simple sums of the annual figures.
No, it didn’t. Over five years the company reported Rs 39 crore of profit and consumed Rs 13 crore of operating cash.
The gap got wider as profits got bigger. FY25 and FY26 were the two most profitable years on paper, and both were cash negative. FY26 was the worst on both measures.
Where did the cash go? Mostly into money customers owe the company. Here’s the working capital picture.
| Year ended 31 March | Debtor days | Working capital days | Return on capital employed (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY23 | 76 | 78 | 23 |
| FY24 | 105 | 80 | 38 |
| FY25 | 112 | 146 | 55 |
| FY26 | 241 | 188 | 27 |
Source: ratios computed from balance sheet and profit and loss data in exchange filings. Period covered: FY23 to FY26. Debtor days measures how long the company waits to get paid.
Debtor days more than doubled in one year, from 112 to 241. That means the company now waits about eight months to collect a typical bill. At FY26 revenue, 241 days implies roughly Rs 60 crore sitting in receivables.
What did the auditor flag in the FY26 accounts?
This is where the report stops being a growth story. The statutory auditor, A. Mishra and Associates, raised two key audit matters in the FY26 audit report.
The first is provisional revenue recognition. The second concerns unreconciled balances of Rs 59.87 crore, where the auditor couldn’t obtain sufficient evidence about existence and recoverability.
Put that number in context. Rs 59.87 crore is about 66 percent of the year’s entire revenue and more than four times the reported net profit. It’s also very close to the receivable balance implied by 241 debtor days, though the filings we could access don’t confirm the two are the same money. That link is our reading, not a stated fact.
There’s a third item. The company’s clarification filing also addressed a contravention of the Companies Act relating to advances given to related parties. Related party means an entity connected to the company’s owners or managers.
The sequence of exchange correspondence matters too, so here it is in order.
| Date | Filing | What it says |
|---|---|---|
| 27 Mar 2026 | Change in auditors | Amit Jaiswal and Associates appointed as internal auditor |
| 24 Apr 2026 | Reply to clarification | FY25 half year results revised after comparative figures were missing in the required format |
| 16 May 2026 | Monitoring agency report | Report on IPO proceeds for the half year ended March 2026 |
| 28 May 2026 | Board meeting outcome | FY26 audited results approved |
| 11 Jun 2026 | Statement of deviation under Regulation 32 | Disclosure on use of issue proceeds |
| 24 Jun 2026 | Exchange clarification sought | NSE sought clarification on the March 2026 results under Regulation 33 |
| 1 Jul 2026 | Company clarification | Response on filing errors, audit observations, revenue recognition and unreconciled balances |
| 9 Jul 2026 | Press release | Intimation of a Rs 375 crore international technical support services contract |
Source: corporate announcements filed with the National Stock Exchange. Period covered: March 2026 to July 2026.
One more figure from the results. Of the Rs 51.82 crore raised in the IPO, Rs 19.09 crore was still unutilised at 31 March 2026, held in fixed deposits and bank balances. That’s about 37 percent of the money still parked roughly seven months after listing.
What about the Rs 375 crore contract?
On 9 July 2026 the company told the exchange it had secured a Rs 375 crore international technical support services contract. That’s a genuine filed disclosure, and it’s a big number.
It’s also about four times the company’s entire FY26 revenue. The counterparty, the contract length, the payment terms and the margin profile aren’t in the filings we could access.
A contract of that size would reshape the company if it converts. It would also demand a lot of working capital from a business that already waits 241 days to get paid. We’re recording it as disclosed and unverified in its detail.
Who owns the stock, and how easily can it be traded?
| Holder category | Sep 2025 (%) | Mar 2026 (%) | Direction |
|---|---|---|---|
| Promoters | 64.07 | 64.07 | Unchanged |
| Foreign institutional investors | 4.98 | 3.42 | Down |
| Domestic institutional investors | 3.68 | 0.88 | Down sharply |
| Public | 27.28 | 31.63 | Up |
| Total number of shareholders | 536 | 545 | Almost flat |
Source: shareholding patterns filed with the National Stock Exchange. Period covered: September 2025 to March 2026, the first two patterns since listing.
545 shareholders is a remarkably small number. For comparison, a typical listed company of similar market value has tens of thousands.
Both institutional groups reduced their holdings in the first six months after listing. Domestic institutions cut from 3.68 percent to 0.88 percent, so they sold roughly three quarters of their position.
Trading is thin. The 21 day average combined daily turnover across exchanges was about Rs 12.8 lakh. A Rs 25 lakh position is roughly twice an entire normal day’s trading in the stock.
Promoters have held 64.07 percent unchanged, with no shares pledged as of the September 2025 disclosure. That’s a point in the company’s favour.
What does the market pay for this today?
| Measure | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Share price | INR 99.20 | Close of 24 July 2026, up 8.96 percent that day |
| Market capitalisation | INR 232 crore | Same date |
| Price to earnings multiple | 16.9 times | On FY26 reported net profit of INR 13.76 crore |
| Price to book value | 2.5 times | Book value per share INR 39.30 |
| Enterprise value to free cash flow | Not meaningful | Free cash flow was negative in FY26 |
| IPO price, September 2025 | INR 84.00 | Listed at INR 103.60 on 10 September 2025 |
| 52 week range | INR 56.00 to INR 108.00 | Trailing twelve months |
| Dividend | None | No dividend has been paid in any reported year |
Source: exchange price data and audited results filed with the National Stock Exchange. Period covered: September 2025 to 24 July 2026.
At 16.9 times reported earnings, this isn’t an expensive looking multiple for a company growing revenue at 62 percent. That’s the honest starting point.
The complication is what sits underneath the multiple. A price to earnings ratio is only as reliable as the earnings figure in the denominator, and the FY26 earnings figure carries an auditor’s key audit matter on revenue recognition plus Rs 59.87 crore of unreconciled balances.
So the low multiple isn’t automatically a bargain, and it isn’t automatically a warning either. It’s a multiple resting on numbers that the company’s own auditor asked questions about.
How does the company create value?
Here’s the chain, step by step.
- Win a client engagement. Usually a bank, telecom operator or retailer with ageing software.
- Staff it with engineers. People are the main input cost, so utilisation drives margin.
- Deliver against milestones. The CMMI Level 5 certificate is the quality credential that gets the company shortlisted.
- Bill the client. Revenue is recognised as work is delivered, which is exactly the area the auditor flagged.
- Collect. This is where the chain currently breaks. At 241 debtor days, cash arrives about eight months after the work.
- Reinvest. Fund the next engagement’s payroll while waiting for the last one to pay.
The flywheel is meant to work like this. Certifications and delivered projects win bigger clients. Bigger clients bring repeat work at better rates. Better rates fund more engineers and more capability, which wins bigger clients again.
That wheel is turning on the revenue side. It isn’t turning on the cash side. Each rotation currently consumes more working capital than it releases, so the spin has been funded by the IPO and by borrowings rather than by the business itself.
What could go wrong?
The unreconciled balances don’t reconcile. If a meaningful part of the Rs 59.87 crore proves uncollectable, it hits both the balance sheet and the credibility of prior reported profits. This is the single largest specific risk in the file.
The related party advances issue escalates. A Companies Act contravention that’s been disclosed can attract regulatory follow up. The remediation plan and the amounts involved aren’t in the filings we could access.
Margins keep compressing. H2 FY26 delivered twice the revenue at 13 percent margins against 33 percent six months earlier. If that mix is the new normal rather than a one off, profit stops following revenue.
The working capital gap widens. Growing a business that collects at 241 days requires constant funding. The company has Rs 9 crore of borrowings and Rs 19.09 crore of unspent IPO money, which is a limited buffer if receivables keep stretching.
Liquidity works against holders. With 545 shareholders and roughly Rs 12.8 lakh of daily turnover, the same thin market that allows a 9 percent up day allows a 9 percent down day. Getting out of a position of any size takes days, not minutes.
The Rs 375 crore contract doesn’t convert as headlined. Large announced contracts sometimes shrink, slip or carry thinner terms than the headline suggests. None of the commercial detail is public yet.
Client concentration is unknown. The company doesn’t disclose its largest customers or what share of revenue they represent. In a Rs 91 crore consulting business, losing one large account can move a year.
What would have to be true for today’s price to work?
Four things, and they’re all checkable in future filings.
First, the Rs 59.87 crore has to reconcile and collect. The FY26 annual report and the H1 FY27 results, due around November 2026, are where that shows up.
Second, debtor days need to come back down from 241. A move toward the 105 to 112 day range the company ran in FY24 and FY25 would show the FY26 stretch was a one off.
Third, operating cash flow has to turn positive. The company has never posted two consecutive positive cash years in the five year record.
Fourth, margins need to stabilise. The half year swing between 33 percent and 13 percent has to resolve toward the higher end, or revenue growth won’t produce profit growth.
How does the quality scorecard read?
| Dimension | Weight (%) | Score out of 10 | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash conversion | 20 | 1 | Five year operating cash flow of negative INR 13 crore against INR 39 crore of reported profit, negative in the latest two years |
| Order book and visibility | 10 | 3 | One disclosed INR 375 crore contract with no public commercial detail; no other pipeline disclosure |
| Moat and management | 15 | 3 | CMMI Level 5 credential is real; offset by audit observations, a Companies Act contravention and a ten month listed record |
| Price versus value | 20 | 4 | 16.9 times reported earnings isn’t demanding, but the earnings figure itself carries audit observations |
| Accounting and governance | 15 | 1 | Two key audit matters, INR 59.87 crore unreconciled, related party advances contravention, two exchange clarifications, one results revision |
| Sector tailwind | 10 | 5 | Enterprise modernisation demand is real; no sourced market size figure available and margins are volatile |
| Sellability | 10 | 1 | 545 shareholders and roughly INR 12.8 lakh daily turnover; a INR 25 lakh position is about twice a full day’s trading |
| Weighted total | 100 | 2.5 | Driven by cash conversion, governance and tradability |
Source: scores assigned from the filed data cited throughout this report. Period covered: FY22 to FY26 plus filings to July 2026.
What should NRI investors know about holding this?
Three practical points apply to non resident Indians holding Indian SME listed shares.
Dividends paid to non residents are taxed in India at 20 percent plus applicable surcharge and cess, subject to relief under the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement. This company hasn’t paid a dividend in any reported year, so the point is theoretical here.
Capital gains on listed equity sold on an Indian exchange are taxed as short term if held twelve months or less, and long term beyond that. Tax is deducted at source for non residents, which means the money is withheld before it reaches you.
Under FEMA (Foreign Exchange Management Act) rules, NRIs buy listed shares through the Portfolio Investment Scheme using an NRE or NRO account linked to a designated bank branch. The practical issue with a stock this thin isn’t the rules, it’s the exit. A holding that takes several days to sell in normal conditions can take considerably longer when the market is stressed.
Frequently asked questions
Is Optivalue Tek Consulting profitable?
Yes, on reported numbers. FY26 net profit was Rs 13.76 crore on revenue of Rs 90.74 crore. The auditor did raise key audit matters on revenue recognition and unreconciled balances in the same accounts.
Why did Optivalue Tek’s earnings per share fall when revenue rose?
Two reasons. The operating margin dropped from 29 percent in FY25 to 20 percent in FY26, and the share count increased after the September 2025 IPO. Together those outweighed the revenue growth.
What is the Rs 59.87 crore unreconciled balance?
It’s an amount the statutory auditor flagged in the FY26 audit report because sufficient evidence about its existence and recoverability wasn’t available. It equals about 66 percent of the year’s revenue. The company responded to the observation in a clarification filed with the exchange on 1 July 2026.
How many shareholders does Optivalue Tek have?
545 as of the March 2026 shareholding pattern, up from 536 in September 2025. That’s an unusually concentrated register for a listed company, and it’s the main reason the stock trades thinly.
Is Optivalue Tek listed on the main board or the SME platform?
It’s on the NSE SME Emerge platform, listed on 10 September 2025 at Rs 103.60 against an IPO price of Rs 84. SME platform companies report results every six months instead of every quarter, so there’s less frequent disclosure than a main board listing.
What is the Rs 375 crore contract Optivalue Tek announced?
The company told the exchange on 9 July 2026 that it had secured an international technical support services contract worth Rs 375 crore. That’s roughly four times its FY26 revenue. The counterparty, duration and commercial terms haven’t been made public.
What this is and is not. This report is educational analysis written out of curiosity. It is not investment advice, not a recommendation to buy or sell any security, and carries no target price. I hold no analyst registration in any country. Markets change, companies change, and figures date quickly. Check the data-as-of date above and verify anything important with the primary filings before acting. Talk to a licensed adviser for decisions about your own money.